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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In the  European  Union  (EU), genetically  modiﬁed  (GM)  crops  are  regarded  as  a  socially-sensitive  tech-
nology.  At  present,  GM  crops  are  rarely  cultivated  in  the  EU and non-genetically  modiﬁed  ingredients
dominate  the EU  market.  However,  most  consumers  are  unaware  of  the  fact  that  many  genetically  mod-
iﬁed ingredients  (GMI)  are  present  in  EU supermarkets  in  spite  of this  virtual  ban  on  GM.  For  example,
eggs,  meat  or milk  derived  from  GM-fed  animals  are  marketed  without  a  GM  label.  Moreover,  the EU polit-
ical landscape  has  failed  to create  a stable  and  predictable  environment  in  which  to  either  implement  or
reject  GM crops  and  their  applications.  As such,  the  present  non-GM  crop  regime  in the EU presents  a
tricky  and  challenging  environment  for agribusiness  companies  to  determine  their GM business  policy.
Few  academic  studies  have  analysed  this  industry  perspective  on  the  current  EU  non-GM  crop  regime.
In  this  paper,  we  therefore  analyse  which  discourses  inﬂuence  the GM  business  policy  of  agribusiness
companies  that are  active  on  the  EU market  and  how  these  discourses  inﬂuence  the  decision-making
process  of  several  agricultural  industry  sectors  on  whether  to include  or exclude  GMIs  in  products  for
the  EU  market.
The  paper  outlines  three  discourses  that  shape  the  discursive  space  of  GM  crop  applications  in the
EU  from  an  industry  perspective,  (i)  GMIs as  an  agricultural  payoff;  (ii)  GMIs  as  a marketing  threat;  and
(iii)  non-GM  crops  as  a preset  end goal. The  paper  also  discusses  how  these  discourses  inﬂuence  the  GM
business  decision-making  process  for  several  agricultural  industry  sectors,  these  being  the  agricultural
biotech  industry,  the  compound  feed  industry,  the  food  manufacturing  and  marketing  industries,  the
potato  industry  and the  organic  farming  sector.  Accordingly,  our research  classiﬁes  the  present  non-GM
crop  regime  in  the  EU as a “wicked  problem”,  due to the  high  level  of conﬂict,  discord  and  complexity
involved.
Wicked  problems  cannot  be  solved,  but  only  managed.  Therefore,  this  paper  proposes  a different  type
of  solution  to  break  the  impasse,  either  in favour  of or against  GM  crop  applications,  by  demanding  multi-
level  stakeholder  engagement  instead  of  the  current  supply-chain-focused  mode-of-action  in industry.
Nevertheless,  it is necessary  to adapt  our  knowledge  about  governing  the particular  dynamics  of  wicked
problems,  and  this  presents  a highly  complex  -  albeit  interesting  - challenge  for  future  research.
© 2014  Royal  Netherlands  Society  for Agricultural  Sciences.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights
reserved.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 272 23 55.
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As only legitimate reasons exist for the non-adoption of a new
technology, the virtual absence of genetically modiﬁed (GM) crops
in European Union (EU) agriculture and on the EU market has
a certain logic [1]. Non-GM crops and non-genetically modiﬁed
ingredients currently dominate the EU market. In total, the EU has
only authorised (and thus legally permitted) 67 GM crops either for
import into the EU, for deliberate release into the environment, or
for processing in food and feed applications. In contrast, the United
States currently has 196 regulatory approved GM crops [2].
vier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Particularly the cultivation of GM crops is uncommon in the
U. Only one GM crop is currently approved for cultivation:
ON810, an insect-resistant variety of maize. The AMFLORA, a
M potato that exclusively produces amylopectin starch for indus-
rial processing was until recently also authorized for cultivation
n the EU (until December 2013), but the European Court of Jus-
ice has withdrawn this authorization as the Commission failed to
dhere to the rules for the EU authorisation process [3]. In 2012,
nly ﬁve Member States (MS) have planted MON810, while eight
Ss  have already legally banned its cultivation on their territory
4]. The cultivation of Amﬂora has also been unsuccessful in the
U, as within the almost 3 years of authorisation its cultivation
eased completely because the agricultural biotech company BASF
topped marketing the potato after 2 years due to social resistance
n the EU [5].
Non-GM crops and non-genetically modiﬁed ingredients thus
orm the dominant regime within the EU today, where “A regime
omprises a coherent conﬁguration of technological, institutional,
conomic, social, cognitive and physical elements and actors with indi-
idual goals, values and beliefs” [6].
However, this does not prevent the presence of genetically mod-
ﬁed ingredients (GMI) in EU supermarkets. Products such as eggs,
eat and milk derived from (imported) GM-fed animals are sold
n the EU market without a GM label. Plant-derived food prod-
cts might also contain an adventitious presence of GM crop traces
below 0.9%) without any GM label - because the EU Regulation only
equires GMI  labelling above a 0.9% threshold, and animal derived
roducts are exempt from GM labelling. Ironically, several MSs  such
s France, Germany and Austria allow GM-free marketing of these
roducts even though they may  indirectly contain GMIs [7]. This
ﬁctitious’ or ‘apparent’ non-GM crop regime has created a tricky
nd challenging environment in which to conduct business. In addi-
ion, the EU political landscape has failed to create a stable and
redictable environment in which to research, regulate and imple-
ent GM crop applications. The EU regulatory approval system for
ew GM crops is, in fact, one of the most stringent worldwide yet
t is sensitive to shifts in public opinion [8]. Although the EU still
cknowledges GM crops as a means to boost a knowledge-based
io-economy, practice proves otherwise [9,10].
Our paper addresses the fact that only a few academic studies
ave analysed the industry perspective on the current EU non-GM
rop regime. How do agribusiness companies stand this regime?
ow do they operate within it? In this regard, a discourse analysis
s an appropriate research methodology, as the analysis of meaning
ecomes central here [11]. In order to understand the positions of
ndustry in this apparent non-GM crop regime, our research ques-
ions are as follows:
) Which discourse(s) inﬂuence the GM business policy of an
agribusiness company for the EU market?
) How are these discourses reﬂected in practice? So, how do they
inﬂuence the business decision-making process of several agri-
cultural industry sectors on whether to include or exclude GMIs
in products for the EU market?
The paper outlines three discourses that shape the discursive
pace of GM crops and their applications within the EU from an
ndustry perspective. It also discusses how these discourses inﬂu-
nce the business decision-making process of several agricultural
ndustry sectors - these being the agricultural biotech industry, the
ompound feed industry, the food manufacturing and marketing
ndustries, the potato industry and the organic farming sector.Accordingly, our analysis classiﬁes the present EU non-GM crop
egime as a “wicked problem” due to its high level of conﬂict, dis-
ord and complexity involved. As there are no true solutions to
olve a wicked problem, addressing it requires multi-stakeholderal of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 103–112
engagement (from industry, amongst others) in order to reach a
shared understanding of a common problem. For most agribusiness
companies, this strategy deviates from their current supply-chain-
focused mode-of-action.
2. Methodology
With respect to the above mentioned research questions, this
study was  based on a discourse analysis [11], where a discourse is
deﬁned as a shared frame of meaning that “Exists in the minds of
people and in the social networks of which they are part. It is based on
their experiences and history, of which they may  be aware or unaware,
but which in either circumstance inﬂuences how they speak and act”
[12]. In line with this deﬁnition, a discourse is constitutive of, and
constituted (i.e. re-produced and transformed) by both social prac-
tices and institutions [11,13]. Our analysis has focused both on how
GM crop applications were deﬁned and problematised by multi-
ple stakeholder groups and on the associated effect on the societal
debate concerning GM crops in the EU.
The discourse analysis relied on an explanatory multi-sector
holistic research design for which several sources of data were
analysed. Our prime data were 41 semi-structured interviews
undertaken between 2010 and 2011. Stakeholders were carefully
sampled in multiple agricultural industry sectors by a snowball
sampling technique [14]. Data-collection ceased when data satu-
ration was reached in each sector. Both (i) individual companies,
with a general product portfolio for either the national, Euro-
pean or world market, and (ii) representatives of the national and
European federations of each sector, were interviewed in the fol-
lowing sectors: the agricultural biotech industry, the compound
feed industry, the food manufacturing and marketing industries,
the organic farming sector, and the potato industry (both the fresh
potato market and industrial processors of chips and French fries).
Sampling was  initiated in these multiple sectors, as each of them
represents an important category of chain actors within the overall
agro-business chain. The potato industry was speciﬁcally included
within the research design as potatoes are one of the ﬁrst likely
GM crop to become available for cultivation and/or processing in
the EU in the shorter term (next 5-10 years) [15], and this increases
the likelihood that the GM criterion was  an upcoming item on the
company’s business agenda.
The initial stakeholder group selection was  veriﬁed and
extended by using a non-probability snowball sampling tech-
nique, which has resulted in the inclusion of environmental
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the research design
- as numerous companies argued that you cannot understand a
company’s GM business policy for the EU market without fully
understanding the stance of NGOs [this inﬂuence by third parties
on actors in the supply chain is commonly referred to as private
governance [16]]. The number of actors interviewed per agricul-
tural industry sector is provided in Table 1. Including food, feed
and societal actors in the ﬁnal research sample takes into account
the complexity of the industrial players in the EU agricultural set-
ting and incorporates chain actors with extreme views in the EU
GM crop debate. Yet, extending this case-study research with other
categories of chain actors may  reveal additional discourses.
The stakeholder sampling was undertaken in Flanders (the
Northern part of Belgium), as this region has a well-established
biotechnology research platform and many regions that are
declared GM-free [17,18]. The interviews explored the reasons for
(commercial) (dis)interest in GM crops and their applications for
the EU market. Much attention was paid to iteratively revising
the interview guide so as to avoid all predetermination. The full
interviews were transcribed ad-verbatim and used as input for the
discourse analysis.
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Table  1
*Overview of the number of in-depth interviews performed in each agricultural
industry sector.
Agricultural industry
sector
Number of
stakeholders
interviewed
Reasons for inclusion in
stakeholder sample
Agricultural biotech
industry
6 Together take into account the
complexity of the industrial
players in the EU agricultural
setting and include chain
actors with extreme views in
the EU GM crop debate.
Compound feed
industry
6
Food manufacturing
industry
6
Food marketing
industry
7
NGOs/Organic farming
sector
5
Potato industry (both
fresh market &
industrial
processing)
11 Crop characteristics make GM
potatoes one of the most likely
crops for cultivation in the EU
in the short-term, and this
increases the likelihood that
the GM criterion is a point of
consideration for the sector.
Total 41
* The table also represents the reason(s) for inclusion of a stakeholder group in
t
e
s
6
a
d
i
t
r
d
p
l
s
i
c
w
d
t
n
s
r
f
f
c
a
p
v
D
3
p
s
a
a
t
p
che ﬁnal stakeholder sample. This stakeholder group selection was veriﬁed and
xtended by using a non-probability snowball sampling technique. Data-collection
topped when data-saturation was reached in each sector.
Each interview was structured with the same code book of
8 bottom-up, clearly deﬁned codes. Inter-coder reliability was
ssured during both the manual and NVivo9 coding phases. Three
istinctive discourses on GM crops and their applications were
dentiﬁed by analysing shared arguments, norms, values, motiva-
ions and practices present within a substantial group of actors -
esulting in collective frames of giving meaning. The three resulting
iscourses were triangulated, revised and reﬁned using multi-
le sources of secondary data (collected between 2010-2013): (i)
egislative texts, press releases, scientiﬁc literature, company web-
ites, and grey literature updates; (ii) regular updates from key
ndividuals; and (iii) during multiple rounds of feedback and dis-
ussion on international fora.
As discourses are closely related to particular groups of actors
ho proclaim them, the ‘discourse coalitions’ associated with each
iscourse were also deﬁned in the analysis [19]. A discourse coali-
ion was based on shared meanings and interpretations, but did
ot necessarily represent a strategic coalition [19]. To avoid the
trengthening of certain coalitions at the expense of others, the
ecruitment of new referees using this snowball sampling was per-
ormed by explicitly asking the referees to suggest other referees
or the study both with the same and other positions and views in
omparison to their own. This request guaranteed the inclusion of
 diverse set of referees in the study and avoided the formation of
redetermined coalition.
Where relevant, quotes from the original interviews are pro-
ided to illustrate our ﬁndings. The quotes were translated (from
utch) and pseudonyms are used for privacy reasons.
. Three discourses shaping a company’s GM business
olicy for the EU market
This section describes three discourses that shape the discur-
ive space of GM crops and their applications in the EU: GMIs as
n agricultural payoff,  GMIs as a marketing threat,  and non-GM crops
s a preset end goal. We  describe them separately and discuss how
hese discourses inﬂuence or shape the business decision-making
rocesses of several agricultural industry sectors on whether to
ommercialise or exclude GMIs in products for the EU market.al of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 103–112 105
3.1. Discourse 1: GMIs as an agricultural payoff
The ﬁrst discourse, GMIs as an agricultural payoff,  is determined
by an agro-industrial perspective on agriculture. Due to its protein
dependency, EU agriculture is considered as a major importer of
(certain) raw materials. GM imports are therefore considered to
be an intrinsic necessity and a ‘by-default’ economic reality in EU
agriculture, as GM crops are extensively cultivated and processed
in other parts of the world. Moreover, the EU GM crop regula-
tory approval system that authorises GM crops for import and
for processing in food and feed applications Regulation (EC) No
1829/2003 is criticised for being slow moving and detached from
its scientiﬁc base. This regulation attracts disapproval for disrup-
ting the free ﬂow of raw materials worldwide while simultaneously
establishing severe import restrictions in the EU. This inability to
implement GM crop applications in EU agriculture, and particularly
in terms of GM imports, is regarded as a threat to the agricultural
capacity of the EU (in the long term). Table 2 illustrates how each
stakeholder group advocates, opposes, or denies the ﬁrst discourse.
According to our analysis, the ﬁrst discourse is strongly advocated
by the agricultural biotech and compound feed industries. This
identiﬁed discourse coalition is shown by the boxes outlined in bold
in Table 2. Yet, discourse 1 affects their decision-making process in
different ways, as we  explain next.
Because GM imports are considered to be a by-default and
imposed reality in EU agriculture, the agricultural biotech indus-
try ﬁles applications to obtain authorisation for new GM crops
in the EU for both import, and processing in food and feed
applications. Although the regulatory requirements to obtain this
authorisation create high compliance costs, the ﬁnancial invest-
ments continue because GM imports are perceived as a by-default
reality. Conversely, R&D investment in GM crops for speciﬁc cul-
tivation in the EU has been considerably reduced and applications
to obtain regulatory authorisations for GM crop cultivation in the
EU are more or less at a standstill. This diminished investment
is a result of the EU GM crop regulatory approval system, as it
is very expensive, time-consuming and totally unpredictable. It
creates signiﬁcant cost pressures, provides low levels of return
on guaranteed investments and offers a highly uncertain out-
come:
“What company can wait 30 years for an [EU regulatory]
approval [for EU cultivation]. It is not possible” (Agricultural
biotech company a).
Moreover, the sector is sceptical about positive regulatory
changes in the near future, particularly because the regulatory
approval system was often criticised for not being applied. The EU
itself is held responsible for impeding the potential of EU agricul-
ture. However, this victimisation stance must be nuanced:
“Herbicide-resistance and insect-resistance technologies,
drought, nitrogen efﬁciency. These traits are the same for
Europe and America” (Agricultural biotech company b), and
“They [BT and MON810] are already crossed-in in the right
varieties, but they are not necessarily ﬁnished. It will take a
certain number of years before they will be cultivated on a large
scale, but new things not at all.” (Agricultural biotech company
c)
The sector favours an evidence-based scientiﬁc approach for the
regulatory approval system. Yet, many of the agricultural biotech
ﬁrms strongly doubt the ongoing value of science in resolving the
current stalemate on GM crops in the EU, because: (1) science can
never be 100% certain about the impact of GM  crops on the envi-
ronment and public health, (2) the overall EU GM crop legislation
is designated as a political game that simply misuses science, (3)
retailers are deﬁned as powerful ‘gatekeepers’ in the supply chain
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Table 2
Discourse 1 Genetically modiﬁed ingredients as an agricultural payoff.  The bold box indicates a stakeholder group which
strongly advocates this discourse.
Agri cult ural
biote ch
industry
“China  looks  at  it [GM crops] in terms  of fo od security, of  fo od supply for its own population.
If as a conse quence  there are shelves  emptied  in  Eu rope  [be cause  of  GM  trace  co ntami nati on],
that is not their concern [...] If things evolve to a situation where one loses the ability to
compete on the world market because it is produced cheaper elsewhere. In the end, EU
agriculture  wil l not continue with a coup le of niche  produ cts. If yo u reali se that 10 to 15 years
ago US farmers produced 10% less when compared to the EU. Today, the picture is reversed.
Their production is 15% higher than in Europe for maize, wheat [...] You cannot maintain a
situation where one continent produces much more efficiently, and another not. So farmers
will ask for these products [GM crops]"
Compound
feed  ind ustr y
“The whole world makes no problem of it [of GM crops]. Europe wants to oppose, but Europe
has no power anymore [...] Before, Europe was the big player. Today everything goes to China
and China poses only limited restrictions. We cannot stop it”
Food
manufacturing
industry
   Dependi ng on  the company’s product  portfolio:
"There is a lack of availability [of non-GM] in some conventional ingredients due to increased
cultivation of GM crops […] For feed, we do not demand GM-free from our farmers, because we
know it  is  a volume  iss ue”
"There are a lot of warnings about it [problems in sourcing non-GM]. It is mentioned in all our
argumentation and there are examples [where non-  GMI sourci ng bec omes very di fficult] that
bother us  [...]  Those small  ingredients  whi ch are di fficult  to  substitut e, that  is  what bothers us
the  most,  fo r example  soy  lecith in. "
Foo d
marketing
industry
   Scatt ered viewpoints:
“That is one of the biggest problems. If Europe is too difficult [referring to its certified non-
GM raw ma terial dema nd] they  [exporters of raw materials]  have  ot her  custome rs who are not
that difficult. So why would they still choose Europe? China asks no questions.”
“As non-GM progresses to become a niche product, we expect an increased tolerance for GM
trace s in non -GM  mat erial s”
Potat o
industry
   Proce ssi ng industry:
“Potatoes for the EU  ma rket  are prod uced  in  Eu rope.  And for  America  they  are cu ltivated
there."
   Fresh  potato  market:
“Eur ope  is  actually  such a big  player in this  system,  it  ca n simply  impose its  GMO crit eria on
niche markets”
Organic
farming sector
“Industrial  agriculture  does  not  have  a  future  [...]  Farmers  with su ch  a  produ ction,   who
specul ate  on the world  market - because they sell  thei r pork  in Rus sia, South-Korea,  etc  - will
not continue in Flanders in the future. Bec ause of the fact that if you want to be a part of that
market,  even   when  includi ng GM  feed,   then   you   have   so  man y ot her  com petiti ve
disadvantages: these being small prod uction  areas,  high  wages,  etc.  You  wil l not make it  there
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land GMO will  not change  that.  Th 
evolve with a focus  on qu ali ty, mor
ho just market what generates the highest proﬁt, and (4) NGOs
ictate to supermarkets as they are able to mobilise the public. In
ther words, investment in GM crops for EU cultivation is reduced
s an outcome of the EU political landscape, while the continued
nvestment in obtaining authorisation for GM crops for import and
rocessing in the EU resides in the discourse that GM imports are
 by-default reality in EU agriculture.
The sectorial decision by the Belgian compound feed industry
o systematically stop non-GM compound feed production (since
007) was made on a strict by-default basis:
“GM crops do not provide any advantage to the feed industry,
so we are neutral in that regard. But one thing is for sure, we
need access to them because they have the lowest price; there
is no alternative” (European compound feed federation).
Before 2007, the decision-making process was dominated by
he direct commercial fear of losing regular customers by not com-
lying with their non-GM product criterion. Today, a cost-effective
ystematic refusal of GM imports is perceived as impossible under
he ﬁctitious non-GM crop regime in the EU. Non-GM raw mate-
ials without GM trace contamination are seen as a niche product
hat is increasingly difﬁcult to source. This economic unease was
nforced by the ‘unfair competition on the GM criterion’ at the
evel of the end product in the EU: EU-produced animal productsans that agri cult ure in Flanders, in the long term, wil l
anic"
derived from non-GM fed animals have to compete with cheaper
imported animal products derived from GM-fed animals (yet not
correspondingly labelled). Recently, the sector has developed an
alternative marketing identity which is technology neutral and dis-
connected from the (non-)GM product criterion [20]. This Certiﬁed
Socially Responsible (CSR) compound feed was for many com-
panies an economic opportunity, as compared to the economic
burden of a systematic non-GM compound feed production. Still,
CSR compound feed remains a somewhat national phenomenon
(in Belgium, The Netherlands and England). The GM business pol-
icy of the Belgian compound feed industry is thus the outcome
of experience that GM imports cannot be rejected altogether in
EU agriculture within the current regulatory landscape due to a
number of insurmountable economic and practical problems.
3.2. Discourse 2: GMIs as a marketing threat
The discourse GMIs as a marketing threat is instigated from a
black-or-white choice marketing consideration, where GMIs might
just be a business opportunity and where compliance with the
social norm is centralised. In this regard, the EU GM crop regulation
must safeguard a non-GM raw material supply for the EU so as to
ensure freedom of choice (in the future). The obligatory labelling
of GMIs - above the 0.9% labelling threshold (in accordance with
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Table 3
Discourse 2 Genetically-modiﬁed ingredients as a marketing threat.  The bold box indicates a stakeholder group which strongly
advocates this discourse.
Agricult ural 
biotec h industry
“Retail ers have played on  the biotec h iss ue to suit  themse lves : all  of a sudd en we sell  organic
produ cts, we sell  no n-GM produc ts. For retailers, lots of peop le are prepa red  to pay  money  
[... ]  You   are  talking   abou t  companies  that  are  agri-commodit y  companies.  We  are  see d 
producers.  Our cli ent i s ou r farmer, not t he con sumer.  We do  not  sell  directl y to con sumers " 
Compound  feed  
indu stry
"For example, retail  reques ted GMO-free  feed ing  on ly in the  last three  mon ths for dair y cattl e 
and  on ly in the last weeks for broil ers. What happ ened du ring  the firs t ph ase of the li fe cycle 
did no t matt er. But they commun ica ted GMO-free  to their  cu stomers. Tha t is also the  rea son  
why  in 2007  we stopped  [no n-GM co mpound  feed  produc tion ]. We saw this hypocri sy by the 
retail sec tor.  Or you   ask it   for  the  who le li fe  cycle,  mayb e  even go   bac k  to  previou s 
generation s, i f you  want t o play it clea n" 
Food  
manu fac turing  
indu stry
“We depend  completely on  ou r customers. If the con sumer do es no t want it  any more, then it  is 
over”                                     
Food  mar keting  
indu stry
“We must be ca reful not to  take over the role of the government. Their role is to d efine what is 
safe and  what is healthy . Our role is as foll ows: if a con sumer do es no t want to foll ow the 
government’s   adv ice ,  then  we  must  still   off er  him  freedo m  of  cho ice   wit hin  the  regu latory 
framework”
Potato industry
“As soon  as  there is con sumer  aversion , then they are very afr aid to lose  market share and  they 
hold bac k [... ] You  can  deve lop  the m [GM po tato vari eties], bu t which process or will  sti ck his 
nec k ou t if he do es no t have a buy er who  see s the po int.  Beca use it  is no t the process or who  
determines  what  is go ing   to  happ en, ac tuall y it   is  Burger King ,  McDona lds,  the ca tering  
indu stry,  the  food   service   and retail.   And   retail   is no thing  bu t  competition .  For  example,  X 
[retail er]  do es no t con sider it  beca use then he has 50  peop le from Greenpeace  striking  in fron t 
of eac h shop "    
Organic farming  
sec tor
"Organic wil l have seriou s prob lems beca use their con sumers  expec t that it  con tains no  GMO 
[...] That GMO enters the regu lar distribu tion  chann els, also the food  sec tor. But you  have a 
number of ca tego ries in agricult ure where it  may no t be used beca use peop le do  no t want that,
such as in organic [... ] It do esn’t matt er whether the con tamination  is abov e or below 0.9%
[…] Con sider it  is betwee n 0 and  0.9%; legall y there is no  dece rti fication  of the batch. What 
happ ens in practice , is that the organic farmer will  no t sell the produ ct as organic, beca use he 
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egulation (EC) No 1830/2003) - is criticised, on the one hand, for
tigmatising GM crop applications while on the other hand it is con-
idered necessary to inform consumers. Table 3 shows how each
takeholder group advocates, opposes, or denies the second dis-
ourse. This discourse is strongly advocated by food manufacturers,
etailers and stakeholders in the potato industry, which together
orm a discourse coalition (Table 3, boxes outlined in bold).
The decision by food manufacturers to include or exclude GMIs
n food products marketed on the EU market is strongly inﬂuenced
y this second discourse. Food manufacturers perceive GMIs as a
tigmatising item, so they opt for a non-GM sales strategy because
t is the most predictable and coherent strategy. Yet in practice,
any food manufacturers process animal products that are derived
rom GM-fed animals and many of their food products may  contain
MI  traces below 0.9%. Non-GM products are not a preset goal for
he sector, but just a means to comply with EU consumer demand.
ccording to their perception, the GMIs themselves can thus offer
eneﬁts. GMIs are a business opportunity, but not on the current
U consumer market. Non-GM product sales are an economic real-
ty for the sector, best described as a workable alternative because
ome ingredients are difﬁcult to source as non-GM certiﬁed. There-
ore, it depends on the company’s product portfolio whether they
ace high costs as a result of the current non-GM sales strategy:
“Despite having almost all kinds of products in our portfolio,
we are actually less affected by GM.  This might sound strange,
but some companies are affected much more severely than us,
because they are in a very speciﬁc branch, such as processing
cereals (Food manufacturing processor a).
Retailers’ decision to commercialise or restrict GMIs in their
tores are also strongly inﬂuenced by this second discourse. Asme bec omes ass ociated wit h that produ ct [a GM-trace  
lso  Testaankoop   [con sumer  organisation ] do es  GM 
they experience GMIs as a stigmatising item, there is consider-
able commercial unease regarding exposure to public criticism and
loss of market share by openly selling GMI-containing products. A
non-GM sales strategy seems the most predictable and coherent
strategy to cope with the uncertainties of the current EU market-
ing environment. Typical of retailers, this GM strategy is framed as
a part of the overall corporate policy on sustainability or healthy
food products, for example. Similar to food manufacturers, retail-
ers also process animal products derived from GM-fed animals in
their generic brand products. Moreover, the animal products they
market may  be derived from GM-fed animals and the food products
sold may  contain GMI  traces below 0.9%. Non-GM product sales on
the EU market are not a preset goal, but a means to comply with
the current consumer demand, and vice versa, GMIs are not a preset
goal but at most a business opportunity when there is signiﬁcant
consumer acceptance. For most retailers, the non-GM sales strategy
is economically tolerable and comparable to other product quality
criteria:
“We  do some controls [on GM traces], but they are limited. We
do not check international brands, mainly only products of our
own  generic brand” (Retailer a).
Stakeholders in the potato industry assess GM potato varieties
on the EU market as a (long-term) business opportunity. In their
view, GM varieties can offer beneﬁts, but not in the current EU
marketing environment. GM potato varieties are just a business
opportunity, not a goal in itself. This sector expects that only a few
GM varieties will enter the EU market in the forthcoming years,
which will most likely be French-fried potatoes for industrial usage,
as these varieties generally have a market of sufﬁcient size to be
commercially attractive for agricultural biotech ﬁrms to genetically
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Table 4
Discourse 3 Non-GM crops as preset end goal. The bold box indicates a stakeholder group which strongly advocates this
discourse.
Agricultural
biotech industry
"The whole approval system in the EU is riddled with politics and MS in particular use science
to hi de the poli tics"
Compound  feed
industr y
"By de finiti on we were not ag ainst it  [non-GM com pou nd feed ], not  at  all. But today we have
a num ber of serious, insurm oun table  practica l prob lems. And they  are four fold:  availa bility  [of
non-GM raw materials], logistic restrictions, low level presence contamination [in hard
identity  preserved raw mat erial s],  and price  [o f  non-GM raw mat erial s,  as  compared to  GM
raw materials"]
Potato  industry
"We respond to our customers’ demand, no GMO in the company. We want to be open to it
[GM varieties],  but  only  if retail  and fast- foo d are  will ing to work with it.  Only  then ca n we
take a step towards using it, but not at this moment. It is too early”
Foo d
manufacturing
industry
"GM is not a goal  in itself. It  is  just a means ”
Food  marketin g “We  are  afraid th at  orga nic  agr icultu re  wil l  disappear   and  then  you  cannot   speak  about
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Orga nic
farming sector
“The less  [GM  crops]  prese nt at the
develop"
odify them. Non-GM sales are not a preset end goal for the sector,
ut currently a self-imposed responsibility to comply with cus-
omer demands. Non-GM certiﬁcates are almost a standard in this
ector, a guarantee that is relatively easy to provide at the moment
s GM potato cultivation is more or less absent from EU agricul-
ure [recently ensured by the withdrawal of the authorization of
mﬂora for cultivation in the EU by the European Court of Justice]
nd extensive product traceability is available within the sector.
.3. Discourse 3: Non-GM crops as a preset end goal
The discourse non-GM crops as a preset end goal is motivated
rom an agro-ecological perspective on agriculture [21]. GM crops
re disapproved of because they are believed to reinforce a glob-
lised and input-dependent EU agriculture while prohibiting a
resumed necessary transition towards more sustainable, local-
dged agricultural practices. Here, GM crops are framed as an
cological and social hazard that hinders sustainable farming while
ndermining freedom of choice by farmers and consumers. Non-
M EU agriculture is a preset end goal and considered as perfectly
easible if some adaptations are made, such as a decreased level
f meat consumption. EU agriculture is considered to be sufﬁ-
iently powerful to import strict non-GM raw materials (contrary
o discourse 1, Table 2). Science is perceived as being inherently
imited and conﬂicting, and unable to provide conclusive proof
hat GM crops are safe in terms of the environment and public
ealth. In addition, the ethical and socio-economic impacts of GM
rops are regarded as equally important. The EU GM crop legis-
ation must therefore implement a strict non-GM crop regime in
he EU while excluding all GM crop applications. Table 4 illustrates
ow each stakeholder group advocates, opposes, or denies the third
iscourse. This discourse is strongly advocated by NGOs and the
rganic farming sector, resulting in a discourse coalition that is also
 strategic coalition, as the organic farming sector largely joins the
nti-GM campaign governed by NGOs [22]. As such, the organic
arming sector can focus its own communication on highlighting
he surplus value of organic products while NGOs take the lead in
he anti-GM communication:
“GMO is just one item amongst all the other aspects of ecolog-
ical foods. We  follow it, so that the consumer hears a critical
sound and so that GMOs are not considered as obvious. But we
mainly have a responsive mode of operating” (Organic farming
association).
Altogether, the business decision-making processes of actors in
he agricultural biotech and compound feed industries were pre-
ominantly determined by the ﬁrst discourse. Conversely, the GMent, the be tter  and the easier the chance  for  organic to
business policy of food manufacturers was  strongly instigated by
the second discourse, as the non-GM sales strategy is perceived
as an own responsibility as long as the majority of EU consumers
reject GMIs. However, multiple food manufacturers have also men-
tioned that some GMIs might become a by-default reality on the
EU market if no measures are taken (according to discourse 1). Dis-
course 2 also strongly determines retailers’ GM business policy.
Although ﬁrm-speciﬁcally, a retailer’s GM business policy might
also be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst discourse, as a few retailers expected
that several GMIs might become a by-default reality on the EU mar-
ket if no measures are taken, contrary to other retailers who  were
totally resigned to the future possibilities of a completely non-GM
EU agriculture (scattered standpoints on discourse 1, Table 2). A
minority of retailers also disapproved GM crop applications from
an agricultural perspective or mentioned the potential hazardous
effects of GM crops on the ecosystem, animal or human health,
therefore aligning with the third discourse on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc basis
(discourse 3, Table 4). In the potato industry, the GM business policy
was strongly determined by the second discourse. Trade problems
with GM potatoes were perceived as very unlikely, so they counter
the ﬁrst discourse from their own  industry’s perspective (discourse
1, Table 2): on the EU fresh potato market, potato varieties are often
imported into and exported out of the EU, but these stakeholders
regard EU agriculture as being sufﬁciently powerful to impose a
non-GM criterion on its supplying countries if required; conversely,
trade in potato varieties for industrial processing (into chips, fries
and croquettes) only occurs occasionally. Hence, EU agriculture
became largely self-supportive in producing its required potato
supply and the EU is expected to be able to freely determine its own
preferred GM-standard. Finally, the business policy of the organic
farming sector is determined by the third discourse, yet they also
partly advocate the second discourse, as GMI  commercialisation
in organic products is perceived as a black-or-white choice mar-
keting consideration, where compliance with demand by organic
consumers is vital (Discourse 2, Table 3). The sector is convinced
that organic farming will persist in any GM crop regime, but they
fear potential reductions in customers, increased production costs,
and loss of their image in the event of GM-trace contaminated har-
vests, if GM crops were to be cultivated on a larger scale in the EU.
Hence, the main difference with the second discourse is the fact
that GMIs are here perceived as not being an option at all.4. Discussion
This paper has analysed which discourses affect agribusiness
companies’ decisions about GMI  commercialisation on the EU
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arket in the context of the apparent non-GM crop regime. Three
istinctive discourses were identiﬁed, which have an inﬂuence on
his business decision-making process. The three discourses are
ot directly compatible and they try to exceed one another, while
ach proposes other policy solutions. This discursive mess suggests
hat the present non-GM crop regime can be classiﬁed as a “wicked
roblem” [23,24], being “A problem that is difﬁcult or impossible
o solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing require-
ents that are often difﬁcult to recognise. The term ‘wicked’ is used,
ot in the sense of evil, but rather its resistance to resolution. More-
ver, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one
spect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems” [25].
icked problems, like complex problems, tend to be non-linear
nd solutions to address them easily generate other problems.
hese types of problems are not solvable by a reductionist or
equential approach. However, wicked problems are a particular
ype of complex problem as they have no ‘closure’ - because there
s no deﬁnite problem statement and thus no deﬁnite solution
26]. Every attempt to address a wicked problem is in fact a ‘one-
hot operation’, as every attempt is likely to cause (unintended)
onsequences which may  spawn new wicked problems [24,26].
.1. The EU non-GM crop regime is a wicked problem
Enumerating the different characteristics of a wicked problem
ndeed classiﬁes the present non-GM crop regime in the EU as a
icked problem [27]:
) Wicked problems are difﬁcult to deﬁne clearly. They have no clear
problem statement, especially because the nature and the extent
of the problem are not clear. GM crops recur in a broad set of
discussions, ranging from the globalisation of agriculture, the
patentability of life forms, the role of science in society, public-
private partnership, and beyond [28]. The problem statement
of stakeholders that advocate the ﬁrst discourse - GMIs as an
agricultural payoff - relates to the potential competitive dis-
advantage of not implementing GM crop applications in EU
agriculture. The second discourse - GMIs as a marketing threat
- problematises the potential commercial risks associated with
GMI  commercialisation on the EU consumer market. The third
discourse of non-GM crops as a preset end goal problematises
GM crops themselves for posing an ecological and social threat.
The study of discourse therefore enables us to deﬁne how a
diverse range of industry actors try to inﬂuence the problem
deﬁnition for GM crops and their applications [11].
) Wicked problems have multilevel actor involvement with many
interdependencies. There are multiple conﬂicting goals at stake that
all emphasise different risks. The number of actors involved in the
GM crop debate has gradually increased over time, as well as the
number of goals at stake [29,30]. The goal formation in the ﬁrst
discourse focuses on incorporating the consequences of a glob-
alised EU agriculture. The second discourse tends to generate
a predictable and coherent sales strategy, while the third dis-
course tries to prevent the cultivation of GM crops in the EU
by all means. Furthermore, the risk-emphasis also shifts in each
discourse. The ﬁrst discourse emphasises the potential compet-
itive disadvantage of not implementing GM crop applications in
EU agriculture (especially GM imports). The second discourse
stresses the potential commercial risks as EU consumers are
perceived to be averse to GMIs. The third discourse emphasises
the potential ecological and social risks of GM crops and their
applications.) Wicked problems are often multi-causal, meaning that different
stakeholders put forward different causes to deﬁne the problem. In
the ﬁrst discourse, the EU political landscape is blamed for cre-
ating an unworkable business situation; advocates of the secondal of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 103–112 109
discourse mainly see a marketing threat in GMIs; supporters of
the third discourse charge GM crops themselves with reinforcing
a globalised and input-dependent agricultural system.
4) Wicked problems have no clear solution. Effective solutions require
coordinated action by a range of stakeholders and they involve
changes at all the levels of society. They are not the respon-
sibility of a single organisation. There are no ‘right solutions’
to resolve a wicked problem, rather they must be managed
[23,27]. Managing a wicked problem requires integrated action
by multiple stakeholder groups as well as changes to individual
behaviour, which can be achieved by imposed measurements
such as legislation, taxes, or penalties, but also by more perso-
nalised actions that engage and alert individuals [31]. Industry
can learn to manage a wicked problem, by changing their
current supply-chain-focused mode-of-action to multi-level
stakeholder engagements (see Section 4.3 for more detail).
5) Attempts to address a wicked problem often lead to unforeseen
consequences. Solutions for tackling a wicked problem often cre-
ate unforeseen side effects and introduce new problems. Measures
to address the non-GM crop regime have caused many unfore-
seen consequences. For example, Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003
- which requires GMI  labelling (above a threshold of 0.9%) -
was  a political attempt to comply with the objective of con-
sumer organisations and NGOs to ensure consumer choice while
still ensuring practicability (as a zero-tolerance threshold level
for GM traces would be unworkable). However, this attempt to
establish a middle ground created a very difﬁcult situation for
the food industries as it prevents them from openly questioning
the safety of GM crops (as many of their products might contain
GM crop traces below 0.9%). Likewise, this Regulation exempts
GM labelling of animal products that are produced from GM-fed
animals. In practice, this exemption has led to unfair competi-
tion for the EU compound feed industry, as EU-produced animal
products (mainly derived from non-GM fed animals) have to
compete with cheaper imported animal products derived from
GM-fed animals (but which are not correspondingly labelled).
6) Wicked problems are often unstable, as the available evidence
and constraints to fully understand the problem are evolving by
themselves - which makes the problem even harder to solve. For
example, the available scientiﬁc evidence for the safety of GM
crop applications in environmental and public health terms is
constantly being adapted. In addition, the Members of the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Parliament are re-elected
every ﬁve years and both of these factors have a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on approving new GM crops for either cultivation, import
and/or processing in the EU. Other examples include the recent
GM-free labelling legislation for non-GM products in some MSs
[7] or the changing number of ofﬁcial bans on GM crop cultiva-
tion in certain MSs  [4]. In summary, the non-GM crop regime
is a dynamic environment where non-GM crops and non-GMIs
remain the dominant culture today.
Based on these multiple criteria, the present EU non-GM crop
regime can be classiﬁed as a wicked problem. It are not the GM
crops or GM foods themselves that constitute the wicked problem,
but the accompanying regime that institutionalises this agricultural
innovation within the EU. Next, we  discuss three tactics to tackle a
wicked problem and we  argue the need for a new type of solution
to break the EU impasse (in either direction).
4.2. Three tactics to tackle the EU non-GM crop regimeIn theory, there are three strategies to tackle a wicked prob-
lem: authoritative, competitive and collaborative strategies [27].
Authoritative strategies try to reduce the complexity of the wicked
problem by eliminating competing points of view on the topic, as
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nly a handful of people are considered able to or responsible for
olving the problem. Stakeholders advocating the ﬁrst discourse
pply this strategy. According to their stance, EU politicians must
nstall a workable GM crop legislation that integrates the conse-
uences of a globalised EU agriculture. Stakeholders in the second
iscourse coalition also apply this strategy, as they associate GMIs
ith consumer acceptability and with politicians who determine
he price and workability of the technology.
The organic farming sector (allied with NGOs) tackles the EU
on-GM crop regime with a competitive strategy. They raise oppos-
ng points of view in an attempt to solve the wicked problem.
ore speciﬁcally, agro-ecologically based agricultural practices are
pposed to the present globalised and input-dependent, industrial
ype of EU agriculture. Moreover, practical problems for EU agricul-
ure caused by asynchronous authorisations, imports contaminated
ith too high levels of GM crop traces, or the inaccessibility of cer-
ain raw materials due to different GM policies are - according to
heir view - just illustrations of the perceived weaknesses of the
resent industrialised farming system in the EU. Notably, ecolog-
cal and social concerns are not the only reason why stakeholders
f the third discourse coalition focus on the prevention of GM crop
ultivation in the EU. Preventing cultivation is also a means to block
ll GM crop applications from the start (as cultivation is always the
rst step) and to perpetuate the deadlock situation with GM crops
n the EU:
“When more crops in GM versions enter the market, different
players may, for purely pragmatic reasons, change their posi-
tion [. . .]  Then the possibility exists that certain players consider
GM-free products more difﬁcult to offer and will perhaps say we
want it [GM free] but we cannot do it anymore. We accept the
situation [with GMIs]” (NGO a).
Finally, the collaborative strategy to tackle wicked problems
ngages all stakeholders in order to ﬁnd the best possible solu-
ion. Both the national and European sector federations endorse
his strategy for their own respective industries: they try to unite
ll the different viewpoints of their members. Their main (and often
nly) point of convergence, however, is a request for freedom of
hoice to reject or utilise GM crop applications on the EU market.
.3. Towards a shared understanding on GM crop (applications)
Managing a wicked problem is a shared responsibility of mul-
iple stakeholder groups. Yet this forced interdependency is the
tumbling block of a wicked problem, as the actors in the vari-
us discourse coalitions neglect or even try to counter the other
iscourses in an attempt to operate in and adapt the EU non-GM
rop regime. Consequently, new facts such as new scientiﬁc evi-
ence or new market developments will not necessarily be able
o change the existing discourses or overturn their impact [27]. A
icked problem can therefore not be solved, but only managed.
ather than ﬁnding the ‘right answer’, stakeholders must seek to
ain a shared understanding of both the problem statement and
he solution formulation. Achieving a shared understanding of this
iven problem cannot be taken for granted, as there are no standard
rocedures to follow. Moreover, the current understanding of
usiness-as-usual hinders the opportunity-driven, action-based
pproach which is necessary to manage wicked problems. This
ype of problem requires experimentation, trial-and-error exer-
ises from industrial and political actors - with the simultaneous
ealisation that every “solution” is a one-shot operation that will
rreversibly change the problem.It is neither GM crops nor GM foods themselves that constitute
he wicked problem in the EU, but the accompanying regime
hat institutionalises this agricultural innovation. As a regime is
 dynamically stable conﬁguration of actors and elements [6],al of Life Sciences 70–71 (2014) 103–112
breaking this impasse with GM crop applications in the EU (in
either direction) may  occur on the basis of external pressures, from
outside the regime such as a WTO  conﬂict or certain raw material
unavailability due to inevitable GM trace contaminations. These
regime shifts do not necessarily imply that also a shared under-
standing of GM crop (applications) has been reached. Conversely,
a regime shift can also be initiated from “inside” the regime, which
does require a problem deﬁnition and solution formulation that
is shared by a substantial group of actors from within multiple
stakeholder groups. In practice, this implies the need for a joint
transition agenda and the formulation of a stable long-term vision
with ﬂexible short-term ‘interim’ goals. To achieve this level of
synergy, collective social learning processes may  be helpful - to
answer questions in relation to the actors’ ideals, ideas, facts and
actions. Alternatively, a socio-technical scenario-based authentic
research design can explore the future concepts, constructs and
relationships in the case of a goal-oriented, a by-default or a
spontaneously initiated regime-shift. This implies that a shared
understanding is a good way  forward to induce a regime-shift,
but also external pressures can break the impasse with GM crops
and their applications in the EU (although these do not necessarily
achieve stable, long-term changes). Nevertheless, the questions
here remain, ‘Who must take responsibility for getting commitment
to action? Will that occur without leadership, mediation, and facil-
itation? Under what circumstances will self-mediation work? If this
does not work, is there a need for ongoing institutional mediation?’
[32]. Accordingly, there is a need to adapt our knowledge about
governing the particular dynamics of wicked problems. A highly
complex, albeit interesting, challenge for future research.
Companies’ strategies to address a wicked problem should in
fact be fourfold [33]. First, a company must engage in generating
a shared understanding of the problem through multi-stakeholder
engagement, “Addressing wicked problems requires ﬁrms to engage
in strategic dialogue and to take action with a diverse set of stake-
holders both inside and outside the supply chain at levels that have
been uncommon in the agri-food sector” [23]. However, efﬁcient
knowledge transfer and knowledge integration are challenging,
because the numerous stakeholders involved have divergent
worldviews, political agendas and professional backgrounds (for
example practical versus positivistic knowledge). Besides, the
parties involved are multidisciplinary as they originate from mul-
tiple layers of society, while participants come and go depending
on how the wicked problem affects groups or individuals at a
particular point in time [34]. So far, only advocates of the third
discourse directly address individuals or the public about GM
crop applications. Some authors argue that this successful public
mobilisation by the anti-GM front in the EU relies on shared values
across the majority of European citizens, while others describe
the anti-GM front (and especially NGOs) as advocacy groups who
impose their ideological opinions on society [35,36]. As GM crops
are applications of a socially-sensitive technology, advocates of the
ﬁrst and second discourses explained that their communication
was either highly distrusted by the public or that they experienced
a high level of commercial unease about becoming openly involved
in the societal debate on GM crops. The second strategic aim of a
company to address a wicked problem should be to clearly deﬁne
their corporate identity - reﬂecting their values, competencies
and aspirations. This serves as the basis for evaluating choices. For
example, most retailers framed their non-GM business policy as
a part of their overall corporate policy on sustainable or healthy
products. A third strategic requirement is that a company must
realise that “Every response to a wicked problem will alter the problem
the company faces and necessitates another change in strategy [. . .]
So to tackle wicked problems, smart companies conduct experiments,
launch innovative pilot programs, test prototypes - and make mistakes
from which they can learn” [33]. However, one test-case with GMIs
 Journ
m
t
t
t
a
n
s
d
i
6
m
a
t
p
a
e
5
o
a
a
t
p
q
c
i
t
t
i
s
t
E
T
e
a
c
a
a
n
t
f
t
t
a
f
t
r
t
I
c
s
k
c
d
o
c
f
t
i
h
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[L. Inghelbrecht et al. / NJAS - Wageningen
ay  result in a lifelong pro-GM “image” for the company. Fourthly,
he company must develop a long-term vision on the issue and
hey must shift their periodic analyses of the business environment
o more constant scanning for weak signals [33].
Many attempts have already been made to increase the work-
bility of the current non-GM crop regime for companies, without
ecessarily trying to unlock it. For example, the CSR compound feed
trategy is a means to cope with the current regime in the EU - by
istancing itself from the GM criterion - but it is not an attempt to
nduce overall changes in it. Likewise, the recent Regulation (EU) No
19/2011 is a political measure to ensure continued trade in com-
odity feed products under the present EU non-GM crop regime,
s this regulation sets a legal tolerance level of 0.1% (instead of zero
olerance) for GM crop traces in imported raw materials that are
rocessed in feed applications but derived from GM crops for which
n authorisation is pending, or for which the EU authorisation has
xpired [37].
. Conclusion
Regime actors institutionalise an existing regime through their
wn practices, which are themselves driven by speciﬁc mindsets
nd institutions. Given that knowledge about GM crops and their
pplications is ‘reconstructed’ while becoming embedded in both
he social and physical environment, the discourse analysis was
articularly valuable as an analytical tool to address our research
uestions. Speciﬁcally, this paper has analysed the different dis-
ourses that shape the discursive space of GM crop applications
n the EU from an industry perspective, emphasising the impor-
ance of observing and modelling the behaviour and attitudes of
he stakeholders involved. Besides, this analysis has generated
nformation that makes the step towards achieving a shared under-
tanding within a process-based approach more amenable.
This paper has also analysed how multiple agricultural indus-
ry sectors make decisions about GMI  commercialisation on the
U market in spite of the present ﬁctitious non-GM crop regime.
hree distinctive discourses were identiﬁed, which have an inﬂu-
nce on this business decision-making process: (i) GMIs as an
gricultural payoff; (ii) GMIs as a marketing threat; and (iii) non-GM
rops as a preset end goal. These three discourses are not mutu-
lly exclusive, as they just emphasise different aspects of GM crop
pplications. These discourses were applied to explain the GM busi-
ess policy of multiple agricultural industry sectors, these being
he agricultural biotech industry, the compound feed industry, the
ood manufacturing and marketing industries, the potato indus-
ry and the organic farming sector. The paper has also shown that
he present non-GM crop regime in the EU is a wicked problem,
nd this explains why top-down and bottom-up initiatives have so
ar failed to break the current impasse (in either direction). At best,
hese initiatives have resulted in new ways to cope with the current
egime.
There are no ‘right solutions’ to resolve a wicked problem, rather
hey must be managed and companies can learn to cope with them.
n this regard, the strategy of a company should be fourfold: (1) the
ompany, amongst other stakeholder groups, must engage in multi-
takeholder engagement (where efﬁcient knowledge transfer and
nowledge integration are challenged because of the high level of
onﬂict and complexity involved); (2) the company must clearly
eﬁne its overall corporate identity; (3) the company should focus
n learning-by-doing instead of analysing the problem; and (4) the
ompany must apply a long-term vision for GM crop applications
or the EU market.Managing a wicked problem is the shared responsibility of mul-
iple stakeholder groups. However, this forced interdependency
s the stumbling block of a wicked problem as the multiple stake-
olders involved have conﬂicting ideas, concepts and categories
[
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through which they give meaning to GM crops and their applica-
tions. In this regard, there is a need to adapt our knowledge about
governing the particular dynamics of wicked problems, which is a
highly complex - albeit interesting - challenge for future research.
An analysis that speciﬁcally focuses on the different social practices
of industry actors could contribute to this required knowledge
of how to govern the dynamics of the non-GM crop regime in
the EU, and it would be a valuable addition to our analysis which
has focused on the various ways in which actors give meaning
to GM crop (applications) and how this agricultural innovation
has become embedded within EU society. Nevertheless, the core
insights from this paper have already contributed to a better
understanding of these social practices, in relation to economic
activities, political arrangements, private governance and supply
chain governance arrangements.
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